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Abstract:   Traditional theories of intermediation are based on transaction costs and
asymmetric information.  They are designed to account for institutions which take deposits
or issue insurance policies and channel funds to firms.  However, in recent decades there
have been significant changes.  Although transaction costs and asymmetric information
have declined, intermediation has increased.  New markets for financial futures and options
are mainly markets for intermediaries rather than individuals or firms.  These changes are
difficult to reconcile with the traditional theories.  We discuss the role of intermediation in
this new context stressing risk trading and participation costs.
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In this paper we review the state of intermediation theory and attempt to reconcile it with the
observed behavior of institutions in modern capital markets.  We argue that many current theories
of intermediation are too heavily focused on functions of institutions that are no longer crucial in
many developed financial systems.  They focus on products and services that are of decreasing
importance to the intermediaries, while they are unable to account for those activities which have
become the central focus of many institutions.  In short, we suggest that the literature's emphasis on
the role of intermediaries as reducing the frictions of transaction costs and asymmetric information
is too strong.  The evidence we offer suggests that while these factors may once have been central
to the role of intermediaries, they are increasingly less relevant.  
  We offer in its place a view of intermediaries that centers on two different roles that these
firms currently play.  These are facilitators of risk transfer and in dealing with the increasingly
complex maze of financial instruments and markets.  Risk management has become a key area of
intermediary activity, though intermediation theory has offered little to explain why institutions should
perform this function.  In addition, we argue that the facilitation of participation in the sector is an
important service provided by these firms.  We suggest that reducing participation costs, which are
the costs of learning about effectively using markets as well as participating in them on a day to day
basis, play an important role in understanding the changes that have taken place.
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we offer a review and critique of the usual views
of intermediation found in the literature.  This critique is supported by data presented in Section 3,
which outlines the changes in financial systems that have occurred over the recent past.  In Section
4 the current justifications for one of the growth areas of intermediary services, namely risk
management, are presented, while Section 5 discusses the risk reduction activities that 2
intermediaries should take.  Section 6 then outlines the importance of participation costs as another
rationale for intermediation and assisting in risk management.  Finally, Section 7 contains concluding
remarks.
2.  Review and Critique of Current Intermediation Theory    
In the traditional Arrow-Debreu model of resource allocation, firms and households interact
through markets and financial intermediaries play no role.  When markets are perfect and complete,
the allocation of resources is Pareto efficient and there is no scope for intermediaries to improve
welfare.  Moreover, the Modigliani-Miller theorem applied in this context asserts that financial
structure does not matter: households can construct portfolios which offset any position taken by an
intermediary and intermediation cannot create value.  See Fama  (1980).
A traditional criticism of this standard market-based theory is that a large number of securities
are needed for it to hold except in special cases.  However, the development of continuous time
techniques for option pricing models and the extension of these ideas to general equilibrium theory
have negated this criticism.  Dynamic trading strategies allow markets to be effectively complete even
though a limited number of securities exist.
Such an extreme view - that financial markets allow an efficient allocation and intermediaries
have no role to play- is clearly at odds with what is observed in practice.  Historically, banks and
insurance companies have played a central role.  This appears to be true in virtually all economies
except emerging economies which are at a very early stage.  Even here, however, the development
of intermediaries tends to lead the development of financial markets themselves. See McKinnon
(1973).
In short, banks have existed since ancient times, taking deposits from households and making3
loans to economic agents requiring capital.  Insurance, and in particular marine insurance, also has
a very long history.  In contrast, financial markets have only been important recently, and then only
in a few countries, primarily the UK and the US.  Even there, banks and insurance companies have
played a major role in the transformation of savings from the household sector into investments in real
assets.
Our understanding of the role or roles played by these intermediaries in the financial sector
is found in the many and varied models in the area known as intermediation theory.  These theories
of intermediation have built on the models of resource allocation based on perfect and complete
markets by suggesting that it is frictions such as transaction costs and asymmetric information that
are important in understanding intermediation.  Gurley and Shaw (1960) and many subsequent
authors have stressed the role of transaction costs.  For example, fixed costs of asset evaluation mean
that intermediaries have an advantage over individuals because they allow such costs to be shared.
Similarly, trading costs mean that intermediaries can more easily be diversified than individuals.  
Looking for frictions that relate more to investors' information sets, numerous authors have
stressed the role of asymmetric information as an alternative rationalization for the importance of
intermediaries.  One of the earliest and most cited papers,  Leland and Pyle (1977),  suggests that an
intermediary can signal its informed status by investing its wealth in assets about which it has special
knowledge.  In another important paper, Diamond (1984) has argued that intermediaries overcome
asymmetric information problems by acting as "delegated monitors."  Many others followed,
expanding on these two contributions and advancing the literature in substantive ways. For example,
see Gale and Hellwig (1985), Campbell and Kracaw (1980), and Boyd and Prescott (1986).
Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) have provided an excellent survey of the current state of the
literature on banking, building on an earlier review of the banking literature published in Santomero4
(1984).  Dionne (1991) contains a set of surveys of the literature on insurance.  Readers wishing
detailed accounts of particular literatures should consult these papers.  Our contribution here will not
be a duplication of these efforts.  Rather, it will attempt to contrast the traditional view of the role
and functions performed by intermediaries with the evolution of these institutions over the last few
decades.  It is an attempt to confront the literature with a view of the practice to see if the literature
adequately addresses the reasons that these institutions exist in the financial markets, and how they
perform value added activity.  
The reality is that the financial systems in many countries have undergone a dramatic
transformation in recent years.  Financial markets such as the stock and bond markets have grown
in size using nearly any metric, such as the value of companies listed or any other conceivable
measure of their importance.  At the same time, there has been extensive financial innovation
accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s.  This includes the introduction of new financial products, such
as various mortgage backed securities and other securitized assets, as well as derivative instruments
such as swaps and complex options.  These have all had a virtual explosion in volume.  At the same
time, new exchanges for financial futures, options and other derivative securities have appeared and
become major markets.  
Interestingly, this increase in the breadth and depth of financial markets has been the result
of increased use of these instruments by financial intermediaries and firms.  They have not been used
by households to any significant extent.  In fact, the increased size of the financial market has
coincided with a dramatic shift away from direct participation by individuals in financial markets
towards participation through various kinds of intermediaries.  
The importance of different types of intermediary over this same time period has also
undergone a significant change.  The share of assets held by banks and insurance companies has5
fallen, while mutual funds and pension funds have dramatically increased in size.  New types of
intermediary such as nonbank financial firms like GE Capital have emerged which raise money entirely
by issuing securities and not at all by taking deposits.  In short, traditional intermediaries have
declined in importance even as the sector itself has been expanding.  
Perhaps in response, but clearly contemporaneously, the activities of traditional institutions
such as banks and insurance companies have also changed.  Banks which used to take deposits and
make loans found that the possibilities for securitizing loans meant that they did not need to keep on
their balance sheet all the loans they could originate.  At the same time, insurance firms realized that
their actuarial function was but a minor part of their asset management capabilities and these firms
too innovated and broadened their products and services. 
Some of these changes in the volume of financial activity, along with the relative importance
of some institutions and the changes in others, can be explained using traditional theories which are
based on transaction costs and asymmetric information.  But, others cannot.  For example, the
standard explanation for the existence of mutual funds is that, while diversification is desirable, the
high costs of trading for individuals makes it expensive for individuals to achieve this.  Mutual funds
can trade at significantly lower cost and so can achieve diversification much more cheaply.  Given this
explanation it might be expected that if individuals' trading costs were lowered the share of ownership
of mutual funds would fall.  However, we have not observed this behavior.  Although with the
introduction of competition for brokerage fees on the NYSE in the early 1970s trading costs for
individuals fell dramatically, the share of assets invested in mutual funds has risen significantly.
Likewise, the advent of the technological revolution has substantially reduced the cost of information
and reduced information asymmetry.  Yet it did not reduce the need for intermediary services and
encourage direct lending by households.  In fact, the data suggests the opposite.  In short, the decline6
in frictions which were allegedly the market imperfections that led to a need for intermediation
services has not reduced the demand for them.  Intermediation is growing and prospering even as the
frictions decline.
The contrast between theory and reality is perhaps most apparent in the area of risk
management.  Arguably the most important change in intermediaries’ activities that has occurred in
the last thirty years is the growth in the importance of risk management activities undertaken by
financial intermediaries.  As we noted above, the change in the breadth of the markets that are
available for hedging risk has not led very many individual or corporate customers to manage their
own risk.  Rather, it has meant that risk management has now become a central activity of many
intermediaries.  Most current theories of intermediation have little to say about why risk management
should play such an important role in the activities of intermediaries.
   In some cases, theories explaining why both financial and non-financial firms should undertake
risk management have been added on to our understanding of firm level decision making.  However,
these descriptions of why they undertake hedging activities are almost an afterthought in the
literature.  Little is offered as a cogent argument as to why intermediaries should be the ones offering
these services, and what value they bring to the activity.  In short, the intermediation literature is
noticeably quiet as to why these institutions should be engaged in one of their central areas of activity.
An important exception is the work of Merton and Bodie, (see, in particular, Merton (1989;
1993) and Merton and Bodie (1995) for a recent overview).  The main theme of this contribution to
the literature is to suggest that financial systems should be analyzed in terms of a "functional
perspective" rather than an "institutional perspective."  A functional perspective is one based on the
services provided by the financial system, such as providing a way to transfer economic resources
through time.  In contrast, an institutional perspective is one where the central focus is on the7
activities of existing institutions such as banks and insurance companies.  The argument in favor of
focusing on the functional rather than the institutional perspective is that over long periods of time
functions have been much more stable than institutions.  This has clearly been a characteristic of the
intermediary sector in the recent past.  Institutions have come and gone, evolved and changed, but
functional needs persist while packaged differently and delivered in substantially different ways.  
This constancy of functional needs has led Oldfield and Santomero (1995) to argue that
financial services such as origination, distribution, servicing and funding are more stable than either
the institutions that provide services or the specific products they offer in order to satisfy customer
requirements.  The financial services may be packaged differently both across competitive institutions
and over time, but the functions are far more stable.  
Using this functional approach to the financial sector, the literature that explains its activities
can be seen as focusing on one or another function performed by it.  The literature on transactions
costs can be seen to be rationalizing the role of these institutions in the distribution function.  The
emphasis on information asymmetries centers on both the origination and the servicing function.  To
this list Merton (1989) adds another role for the sector.  He argues that another central feature of the
sector is its ability to distribute risk across different participants.  A model is developed where the key
value added of intermediaries is that they provide the function of allowing risk to be allocated
efficiently at minimum cost.  
Merton notes that intermediaries can transact at near zero cost while individuals have high
trading costs.  This means that intermediaries can create a large number of synthetic assets through
dynamic trading strategies.  By hedging appropriately, they can create products with very safe payoffs
which Merton argues are particularly valuable to some intermediaries' customers.  Alternatively they
can engineer products with varying degrees of complexity if their customers need such securities.8
This addition to the list of services provided by the financial sector is quite consistent with its
observed activities of late. They have increasingly been focused on the trading of risk and the
bundling and unbundling of the risks of various financial contracts.  To see this trend in their
activities, let us review the recent history.
3.  Recent Changes in Markets and Intermediaries  
It is widely acknowledged that there has been an unprecedented amount of financial
innovation in recent years. See, e.g., Miller (1986).  However, financial innovation has been occurring
for many centuries albeit at a slower pace.  Allen and Gale (1994a) offer a detailed historical account
of financial innovation.  They point out that numerous different types of instruments were developed
over time but relatively few survived.  By the 1930s what might be termed the traditional financial
instruments had been developed and had demonstrated some robustness.  These instruments are
outlined in Table 1.
In practically all countries government securities have been the most important type of
instrument traded in financial markets.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth century banks and
insurance companies played the major role in transforming savings by households into investment in
real assets by firms.  Banks would take deposits from households and make loans to firms; insurance
companies would issue policies and lend the proceeds to firms or invest in security markets.  In the
US and UK markets for securities issued by firms were significant in terms of the assets outstanding,
but in most other countries this was not the case until the post-war era.  The financial markets in the
US and UK, particularly the equity and bond markets, were predominantly participated in by
individuals rather than intermediaries.  In the US, in addition to the equity and bond markets, there
were also the exchanges in Chicago where commodity futures were traded starting in the mid-9
nineteenth century.  
Markets for traditional instruments have grown substantially in recent years.  This is not only
in absolute terms but also in relative terms.  For example, Figure 1 shows market capitalization of
corporate equity as a percentage of GDP from 1975-1994 for the US.  It can be seen that there has
been a distinct long term increase in market capitalization relative to GDP.  
However, even as financial assets were increasing,  another trend in the data has become clear.
A notable feature of markets for traditional instruments in the past few decades has been the drop in
use by individuals.  As Figure 2 indicates the ownership of corporate equity by individuals in the US
has fallen from about 85% in the mid-1960's to around 50% in recent years.  At the same time Figure
3 shows how the share of mutual and closed end funds, pension funds and insurance companies has
correspondingly changed.  The amount of financial claims held directly by households has clearly
fallen dramatically.  Intermediation has become significantly more important and has been the
predominant source of new financial resources flowing into the capital markets over the past several
decades.  Figure 4 shows how the ratio of mutual fund holdings to householder equity ownership has
risen from about 5% in 1980 to around 25% by 1995.
Starting in the 1960s but primarily in the 1970s and 1980s, the markets themselves have
changed significantly.  Table 2 shows some of the most important innovations that have occurred.
Again, see Allen and Gale (1994a) for a detailed account.  Arguably the most successful type of
innovation has been the development of various kinds of derivative securities which have been
introduced over this period.  This includes the financial futures and options listed on exchanges and
the new over-the-counter (OTC) instruments such as swaps.  
Standardized markets for financial futures and options started with the introduction of foreign
currency futures at the International Monetary Market (IMM), (which is part of the Chicago10
Mercantile Exchange) in 1972.  Other types of futures contracts were introduced in the following
years.   Successful examples were the IMM's ninety-one day T-bill contract and the Chicago Board
of Trade's (CBOT) Treasury bond contract which were introduced in 1976 and 1977, respectively.
Other countries introduced financial futures markets in the 1980s with the London International
Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) being started in 1982 and the Tokyo Futures Exchange (TFE)
in 1985.
The first standardized options were introduced in 1973 by the Chicago Board Options
Exchange (CBOE).  The CBOE was immediately successful, and by 1984 it had become the second
largest securities market in the world with only the New York Stock Exchange being larger.  This
success led other US and foreign exchanges to introduce options exchanges.  These included the
American Stock Exchange, The Philadelphia Stock Exchange, the European Options Exchange in
Amsterdam and the London Stock Exchange.
In addition to the development of exchange traded derivatives there has also been a huge
increase in the volume of OTC derivatives, particularly swaps.  The first swaps were currency swaps
and occurred in the 1960s as a way for UK firms to circumvent exchange controls.  They involved
swapping a stream of payments in one currency for a stream of payments in another currency.  The
basic techniques developed for currency swaps were then applied in other contexts, most importantly
in swapping fixed rate loans for adjustable rate loans.
Table 3 shows the notional amounts outstanding as of March 31, 1995 and the turnover based
on April, 1995 data for exchange traded derivatives and OTC derivatives.  The gross market values
are also provided for OTC derivatives.  The data is given on a global basis.  It can be seen that both
exchange traded and OTC markets are large in terms of all these measures.  
Perhaps the most interesting feature of these markets, however, is who it is that uses them.11
Figure 5 shows that financial institutions are the primary users of the OTC markets accounting for
82% of its volume compared to 18% for all other participants.  This latter group includes the sum
total of all nonfinancial firms, governments and individuals.  These figures indicate that there is a huge
amount of derivatives trading by intermediaries.  These institutions are buying and selling the
unbundled state contingent cash flows associated with financial claims among themselves and on
behalf of their clients.  In essence they are actively trading risk to and for their clients for risk
management purposes.  
In addition to derivatives, the other major innovation mentioned in Table 2 that has been
successful is securitized loans.  As is well known, this market began with the developments in the
mortgage market.  The market for mortgage-backed securities in the US dates back to the 1950s at
least but it was not until the 1970s that it became important in terms of the volume outstanding.  The
critical development was the introduction of "pass-through" securities by the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae) in 1970.  These allowed shares in a pool of mortgages
to be freely traded without transfer of title of individual mortgages which was necessary previously.
The bank that services the loan, i.e., collects the payments and deals with other administrative aspects,
earns a fee for undertaking these tasks.  
Other types of securitized loans quickly followed including commercial mortgages, bank
loans, automobile loans and credit card receivables.  Figure 6 shows the tremendous growth in just
one type of securitized loans, i.e. mortgage pools, that has taken place over the past 30 years
particularly since the early 1980s, while Figure 7 shows the corresponding growth in bank loans and
consumer credit.  A comparison of the two figures indicates that securitized loans have overtaken
both of these categories in terms of volume outstanding.  The fact that securitization has become so
important in recent years suggests that asymmetric information cannot be that important for the loans12
that have been securitized.  If this were the case, there would be an adverse selection or "lemons"
problem with bad risks attempting to securitize more than good risks.  As an empirical fact this
appears not to be the case.
The final type of innovation mentioned in Table 2 is securities directly issued by firms.  In
terms of volume issued most of these have been relatively unimportant compared to derivatives or
securitized loans.  However, the trend is important particularly in light of our previous comments on
the changing nature of the information set available to market participants.  
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented here indicates that the traditional distinction
between financial markets, where securities are issued by firms and directly owned by individuals, and
intermediaries, where depositors and policyholders provided funds to banks and insurance companies
who lent out these funds, has broken down.  Financial markets for equity and debt are becoming
increasingly dominated by intermediaries such as mutual and pension funds.  The volume of
transactions in these markets and those trading more complicated financial claims has become
dominated by these same intermediaries, as well as the participants representing the standard
institutions, i.e., commercial and investment banks and insurance companies.  Indeed, the operations
of many large banks and insurance companies have changed dramatically over this period, with
trading activity occupying the bulk of their efforts.  
The increased use of securitization of loans has exacerbated this trend in that it has altered the
lending functions performed by banks.  Now much of the asset origination activity is merely the first
step to asset sales or complex stripping and repackaging.  At the very least such assets are viewed
as available for sale.
However, perhaps the most significant trend that is evident  in the data is the increased
concentration by banks and insurance companies as well as other financial institutions in the business13
of asset trading and risk shifting.  The huge amounts of derivatives outstanding and the turnover
suggest that this has become a major, and perhaps the most important, activity for the sector.  
4.  Current Rationales for Risk Management
As discussed in Section 2, current theories of intermediation focus on transaction costs and
asymmetric information.  These factors can explain traditional intermediation but are less satisfactory
in explaining the developments outlined in the previous section.  Moreover, they are unable to
satisfactorily explain the huge amount of risk management that is undertaken by intermediaries.  In
this section we consider the current rationales for the interest in risk management that is evident in
the market.  While these theories have been described above as somewhat of an add on to our basic
optimization models, it is worthwhile to review our understanding of why customers of intermediaries
have a need to trade and manage risk.  It is particularly important in light of the fact that the trading
of risk appears to have become central to the role of intermediation.  
The literature on why firms manage risk at all is usually traced back to 1984.  In that year
Stulz (1984) first suggested a viable economic reason why a firm's managers, who are presumed to
be working on behalf of firm owners, might concern themselves with both expected profit and the
distribution of firm returns around their expected value.  He provided a rationale for why firm's
objective functions may be concave so they actively want to avoid risk.  His contribution is widely
cited as the starting point of this burgeoning literature.  Since that time a number of alternative
theories and explanations have been offered.  Recently, Santomero (1995a) has presented a useful
review of these explanations upon which we shall draw here.  They can be divided into four 
1) Managerial Self Interest
2) The Non-Linearity of Taxes14
3) The Costs of Financial Distress
4) The Existence of Capital Market Imperfections
In each case, the economic decision maker is shown to face a non-linear optimization, and this
leads it to concern itself with the variability of returns.  In the first case the objective function itself
is concave, while in the others the effect of some feature of the economic environment is to lead firm
managers to behave in a risk averse manner.  We begin with a brief description of each theory.
4.1  Managerial Self Interest
Stulz (1984) argued that firm managers have limited ability to diversify the significant portion
of their personal wealth held in the form of stock in the firm and the capitalization of their earnings
from the firm.  Therefore, they prefer stability of the firm's earnings to volatility because, other things
equal, such stability improves their own utility, at little or no expense to other stakeholders.  This
argument can be traced back to the literature on agency.  In this area, the relationship between firm
performance and managerial remuneration is clearly developed in such work as Ross (1973; 1977).
Objections have been offered, however, to this line of reasoning by those arguing that
managerial self interest in diversification need not occur on the firm's balance sheet.  See Santomero
(1995 a) for a discussion of this point.  However, the work of Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and
DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) makes the managerial self interest argument more compelling.  They
point out that observed outcomes may influence owner perception of managerial talent.  This would,
in turn, favor reduced volatility, or at least the protection of firm specific market value from large
negative outcomes that may be found within the distribution of possible returns.  For this, if for no
other reason, there appears to be ample justification for the assumption that managers will behave in
a manner consistent with a concave objective function.  
4.2  The Non-Linearity of Taxes15
Beyond managerial motives, firm level performance and market value may be directly
associated with volatility for a number of other reasons.  The first is the nature of the tax code, which
both historically and internationally is highly non-linear.  This point was brought to our attention by
Smith and Stulz (1985) and Gennotte and Pyle (1991) and emphasized by others as a key rationale
of risk reduction.  With a non-proportional tax structure, income smoothing reduces the effective tax
rate and, therefore, the tax burden shouldered by the firm.  By reducing the effective long term
average tax rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported earnings will enhance shareholder
value.  Graham and Smith (1996) have conducted a careful examination of the degree of convexity
in the current U.S. tax code.  They find that on average the tax function is convex primarily because
of tax loss carrybacks and carryforwards but in some circumstances it is concave.  For firms with a
convex tax function the average tax savings from a 5% reduction in volatility of taxable income are
about 5% of expected tax liabilities.
Again, there have been objections to this rationale.  Reported earnings may be different than
economic earnings, for example.  Economists have long been suspicious of accounting reasons for
economic decisions.  However, no matter how tenuous the rationale should not be dismissed out of
hand.
4.3  The Costs of Financial Distress
The third reason is perhaps the most compelling of the four.  Firms may also be concerned
about volatility of earnings because low realizations lead to bankruptcy.  When bankruptcy is costly
the firm will try to avoid it and so will behave as if it had a concave objective function.  
This rationale seems the most reasonable one to us, as there is a long literature dating back
to Warner (1977) on the costs of bankruptcy.  More recently Weiss (1990) has continued to offer
evidence of this feature of financial distress.    16
The cost is, perhaps, more important in regulated industries, however.  In these cases, large
losses may be associated with license or charter withdrawal and the loss of a monopoly position.  This
has led some to argue that this rationale offers significant insight into why banks themselves may
choose low risk strategies (see, for example, Marcus (1984) or Santomero (1989)).  In all cases,
however, the cost of financial distress must be non-linear and is frequently modeled as discrete, as
linear cost functions do not lead to the required behavior.
4.4  Capital Market Imperfections
In a series of papers, Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1989; 1993; 1994) accept the basic
paradigm of the financial distress model above, but rationalize the cost of bad outcomes by reference
to Myers' (1977) debt overhang argument.  In their model, external financing is more costly than
internally generated funds due to capital market imperfections.  These may include discrete
transaction costs to obtain external financing, imperfect information as to the riskiness of the
investment opportunities present in the firm, or the high cost of potential future bankruptcy.
At the same time, the firm has an investment opportunity set which can be ordered in terms
of net present value.  The existence of the cost imperfections results in underinvestment in some
states, where internally generated funds fall short of the amount of new investment that would be
profitable in the absence of these capital market imperfections.  Stated another way, the volatility of
profitability causes the firm to seek external finance to exploit investment opportunities when profits
are low.  The cost of such external finance is higher than the internal funds due to the market's higher
cost structure associated with the factors mentioned above.  This, in turn, reduces optimal investment
in low profit states.
The cost of volatility in such a model is the foregone investment in each period that the firm
is forced to seek external funds.  Recognizing this outcome, the firm embarks upon volatility reducing17
strategies, which have the effect of reducing the variability of earnings.  Hence, risk management is
optimal in that it allows the firm to obtain the highest expected shareholder value.  
4.5  Discussion  
The theories presented are designed to explain why firms, both financial and nonfinancial,
might be interested in undertaking risk management.  The discussion above has focused on the
benefits from hedging but has not mentioned the costs.  These include the direct transaction costs and
the agency costs of ensuring managers transact appropriately.  These are arguably significant.  To
begin with the transaction costs of hedging include the costs of trading.  Perhaps more importantly,
though, they also include the substantial cost of information systems needed to provide the data
necessary to decide on the appropriate hedging positions to take.  Then, there are the agency costs
that such activities bring.  These include the problems associated with the opportunities for
speculation that participation in derivative and other markets allow.  Recent scandals at
Metalgesellschaft, Barings and other firms, where billions of dollars were lost are extreme examples
of these agency costs.  They have been demonstrably substantial.
The plausibility of the four explanations for risk management varies especially if these costs
are taken into account.  The nonlinearity of taxes is perhaps the least plausible.  The tax savings
indicated by Graham and Smith (1996) seem unlikely to be able to justify the huge amount of risk
management absorbed, especially if the costs of these strategies are taken into account.
The arguments based on managerial self interest and capital market imperfections are more
plausible, but again it is not clear that the benefits outweigh the costs.  Shareholders could prohibit
managers from managing risks and use the cost savings realized to compensate them for the increased
risk.  With capital market imperfections the NPVs of the marginal projects that become feasible
because of the smoothing of cash flows would need to be substantial to compensate for the risk18
management costs incurred.
Of the four, perhaps the most plausible rationale is bankruptcy costs.  It has been widely
argued that these are substantial.  They no doubt explain a significant part of the risk management
that takes place.  However, it is not clear why alternative strategies such as reducing the amount of
debt or using instruments which do not precipitate bankruptcy are not superior given the costs
associated with risk management.
Nonetheless, the result is to offer a rationale for the demand for both risk management
services offered to customers and perhaps risk management at the firm level too.  Managers appear
to be interested both in expected profitability and the risk, or variability, of reported earnings and
market value.  The firm is led to treat the variability of earnings as a choice variable that it selects,
subject to the usual constraints of optimization. See Smith, Smithson, and Wilford (1990) for an
example of the procedures employed.  The banker now has a customer for risk management services.
However, one important characteristic of the data considered in Section 3 is that a majority
of trading in financial assets, including both traditional assets and derivatives is undertaken directly
by financial institutions.  Rationales for why risk management should be offered in this form are not
obvious.  Specifically, why should institutions be the principal participants in the bulk of financial
transactions, what types of transactions should they engage in directly, and what is the core value
added of their activity?  Theory should be able to explain these things.  It is our contention that it is
the ability of these institutions to perform value added services in some of these markets most
efficiently and knowledgeably that is the key competency of the sector.  This determines where they
trade and how they add value by reducing participation costs to outsiders that wish the benefit of
these markets.19
5. Understanding the Role of Intermediaries in Risk Trading
By dealing in financial assets, intermediaries are by definition in the financial risk business.
By virtue of the fact that they originate, trade, or service financial assets, intermediaries are managing
and trading risk.  As Merton (1989) noted, a key feature of their franchise is the bundling and
unbundling of risks. However, some of the risks inherent in the intermediaries' franchise will not be
borne directly by them.  Some will be traded or transferred, and others will be eliminated altogether.
In fact, it is useful to decompose the risks inherent in financial assets into these three subgroups.  This
will allow us both to consider which risks belong to each group and how intermediaries deal with
each type of risk.  Using this approach, risks can be segmented into the following groups:
(a) risks that can be eliminated or avoided by business practices;
(b) risks that can be transferred to other participants; 
(c)  risks that must be actively managed at the firm level.
In the first of these cases, the charge of the financial intermediary is to engage in actions to
reduce the chances of idiosyncratic losses by eliminating risks that are superfluous to the financial
transaction's purpose.  Common risk avoidance actions, here, are underwriting standards, due
diligence procedures, and portfolio diversification.  In each case the goal is to rid the financial
transaction of risks that are inconsistent with the desired financial characteristics of the asset, or not
essential to the financial asset being created. What remains is some portion of systematic risk, and
the idiosyncratic risks that are integral to a product's unique business purpose.  In both of these cases,
risk reduction remains incomplete and could be further enhanced.  In the case of systematic risk, any
element not required or desired can be minimized by offsetting hedging activity.  Whether or not this
is done is a decision that can be clearly indicated to asset holders whether they are stockholders of
the institution creating the asset and bearing the risk or a buyer obtaining ownership of the traded20
asset.  The idiosyncratic risk also can be virtually eliminated.  However, such actions are costly and
it is up to the institution to determine the point where the cost of further risk reduction is higher than
its value.
Risks can also be eliminated from a financial transaction, or at least substantially reduced,
though risk transfer.  Other market participants can buy or sell financial claims representing a portion
of the state contingent payoffs to diversify or concentrate the risk in their portfolios.  This is achieved
through separate contracts offsetting certain state contingent payoffs such as swaps, or by the
issuance of financial contracts which leaves some of the inherent risk of the transaction with the other
party.  Adjustable rate lending is a case in point.
To the extent that the financial risks of the asset created or held by the financial firm are
understood by the market, they can be sold easily to the open market at their fair market value.  If
the institution has no comparative advantage in managing the attendant risk, there is no real reason
for the firm to absorb and/or manage such risks, rather than transfer them.  In essence, there is no
value added to risk absorption at the firm level for such asset characteristics.
Then, there is the last class of assets or activities, where the risk inherent in the activity must
and should be absorbed at the originating firm level.  In these cases, good reasons exist for using
further resources to manage firm level risk.  These are financial transactions or contractual
relationships that have one or more of the following characteristics.  First, the equity claimants, or
others for whom the institution has a fiduciary interest, may own claims that cannot be traded or
hedged easily by the investors themselves.  For example, defined benefit pension plan participants can
neither trade their claims nor hedge them on an equivalent after-tax basis.  A similar case can be made
for policies of mutual insurance companies which are complex bundles of insurance and equity.
Second, activities where the nature of the embedded risk may be complex and difficult to reveal to21
non-firm level interests.  This is the case in institutions such as banks, which hold complex, illiquid
and proprietary assets.  Communication in such cases may be more difficult or expensive than hedging
the underlying risk.  Moreover, revealing information about customers or clients may give
competitors an undue advantage.  Third, moral hazard may exist such that it is in the interest of
stakeholders to require risk management as part of standard operating procedures.  For example,
providers of insurance can insist that institutions with insured claims follow business policies that
maintain the basis of the insured risk.  A fourth reason for risk absorption at an institution is that it
is central to the intermediary's business purpose.  An index fund invests in an index without hedging
systematic risk.  A security dealer normally hedges his positions, since profits accrue from order flow.
However, if the dealer's purpose is proprietary trading and arbitrage, positions would not be routinely
hedged.  In all of the above circumstances, risk management activity requires management to monitor
the risks and return of its business activities.  This is part of the nature of their doing business since
it springs directly from their franchise in the financial market. 
With legitimate institutional risk management rationales defined and outlined, non-economic
or redundant risk taking can also be identified. In short, if the risk absorption plays no fundamental
role in the institution's franchise it is best to transfer the risk to the market.
But, who is the market?  From our perspective it consists of two different groups, loosely
defined as the involved and the uninvolved.  The first of these are the market participants of economic
theory.  They are fully informed at each instant of time and are active participants in the dynamic
management of their portfolio of financial assets.  Then, there is the second group.  These are usually
described as uninformed.  They are making decisions with limited information on both the nature of
the financial claims involved and the most recent information on fair market value.  It is to this group
that the financial intermediary offers participation services.  These may be provided by offering22
information to the uninformed investor, by investing on their behalf, or by offering a fixed income
claim against the intermediary’s balance sheet.  In any case, the investor gains access to the market
through the intermediary’s  services, which add value to the transaction by reducing the perceived
participation costs of the uninformed investor. 
6.  Intermediation and Participation Costs
Traditional frictionless theories where intermediaries do not add value and there is no need
for intermediaries to manage risk assume all investors are involved and there is full participation in
markets.  However, there is extensive evidence that full participation is not an assumption which
holds in practice.  Typical households hold few stocks and participate in only a limited number of
financial markets.  Rather than full participation there is limited market participation.  
Blume, Crockett and Friend (1974) develop a measure of portfolio diversification which takes
into account the proportion of each stock held in individuals' portfolios.  Based on this measure, they
find that the average amount of diversification is equivalent to having an equally weighted portfolio
with two stocks.  Blume and Friend (1978) provide more detailed evidence of this lack of
diversification.  They find that a large proportion of investors have only one or two stocks in their
portfolios, and very few have more than ten.  These results concerning the small number of stocks
most investors hold cannot be explained by them holding mutual funds.  Figure 4 indicates that until
the 1980s, the value of mutual funds held was only about 5% of the total amount of households'
equity. 
King and Leape (1984) analyze data from a 1978 survey of 6,010 U.S. households with
average wealth of almost $250,000.  When assets are categorized into 36 classes, they find that the
median number owned is 8.  Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) find that only a small proportion of investors23
own stocks.  Of those with liquid assets in excess of $200,000, only 47.7 percent hold any stocks.
One plausible explanation of limited market participation is that there are fixed costs of
learning about a particular stock or other type of financial instrument.  In order to be active in a
market, an investor must devote time and effort to learning how the market works, the distribution
of asset returns and how to monitor changes through time.  Brennan (1975) has shown that with fixed
setup costs of this kind it is optimal to invest in a limited number of assets.  King and Leape (1984)
find empirical evidence that is consistent with this type of model.  
In addition to the fixed costs of market participation there are also arguably extensive
marginal costs of monitoring markets  on a day to day basis.  Such monitoring is necessary to see how
the expected distribution of payoffs is changing and how portfolios need to be adjusted.  To the
extent investors are following dynamic trading strategies to create synthetic securities they will need
to follow the market on a continuous basis.
The assumption of limited market participation has been used in a number of asset pricing
theories including Merton (1987), Hirshleifer (1988), Cuny (1993) and Allen and Gale (1994b).  What
we shall argue here is that costs of participation are important in understanding intermediation and
the changes that have occurred in recent years.
The first change that was focused on in Section 3 was the reduction in the proportion of
equity owned directly by households and the corresponding increase in the amount held by
intermediaries.  The standard story for why stock is held indirectly in these intermediaries is the
desirability of diversification and the high trading costs for small portfolios.  As pointed out above
trading costs have fallen dramatically since the 1970s which would seem to suggest mutual funds' role
should have been reduced.  However, as Figure 4 illustrates the ratio of mutual funds to householder
equity ownership has risen from about 5% in 1980 to around 25% by 1995.  This change can be24
explained in terms of participation costs.  The value of people's time, particularly that of many
professionals, has increased significantly in the last fifteen years.  Mutual funds have low participation
costs and thus are an efficient method to invest for individuals whose costs of direct participation
have risen.
The second development outlined in Section 3 was the heavy use of derivatives by financial
institutions for risk management.  Theory based on the absence of frictions suggests households
should be constantly reviewing and altering their portfolios as new information becomes available.
If participation costs are taken into account, this is clearly unrealistic.  It does suggest, however, that
a main role of intermediaries is to create products with relatively stable distributions of returns.  This
allows investors to monitor their asset holdings on a relatively infrequent basis which is a very
valuable characteristic.  
One of the striking features of the securities that investors do hold is that many are debt or
debt-like.  This type of security has low participation costs.  Except for the possibility of default, there
is no need to monitor these assets through time and the costs of learning about the market are low.
To the extent that the probability of default can be lowered, given the cost of participation, the value
of the securities will be increased.
A theory of intermediation based on participation costs is thus consistent with the fact that
intermediaries trade risk and undertake risk management to such a large extent.  See Santomero
(1995b) and Babbel and Santomero (1996). By creating products with stable distributions of cash
flows they can lower participation costs for their customers.  In extreme cases this may involve
creating low risk debt, but even with more risky securities the stability of distributions is important
in minimizing the costs of revising portfolios through time.
The participation costs rationale is also consistent with firms undertaking risk management.25
The purchasers of firm stocks will typically be more sophisticated in the sense that they have already
incurred the fixed component of participation costs.  However, they must also bear some marginal
costs to maintain their knowledge of firm performance and its probability of success.  To the extent
these can be lowered by firms managing risk then value is created.  A theory of intermediation based
on participation costs can thus explain why firms manage risk but to a lesser extent than financial
intermediaries.
7.  Concluding Remarks
This paper has suggested that theories of intermediation need to reflect and account for the
fact that financial systems in many countries have changed substantially over the past thirty years.
Over this period many traditional financial markets have expanded and new markets have come into
existence.  Transaction costs have fallen and information has become cheaper and more available.
However, these changes have not coincided with a reduction in intermediation.  In fact, quite the
reverse has happened.  Intermediaries have become more important in traditional markets and account
for a very large majority of the trading in new markets, such as those for various types of derivatives.
Standard theories of intermediation based on transaction costs and asymmetric information are
difficult to reconcile with the changes that have taken place.  We have argued that participation costs
are crucial to understanding the current activities of intermediaries and in particular their focus on risk
management.
This paper has focused on intermediation theory.  The fact that markets have become more
dominated by intermediaries also has important implications for asset pricing theory.  Current asset
pricing theories usually assume investors choose optimal portfolios directly.  The fact that there is
such extensive intermediation suggests that this approach may miss important features of actual26
markets.  For example, Allen and Gorton (1993) have shown that if intermediaries make investment
decisions on behalf of investors markets can be inefficient in the sense that asset prices differ from
fundamentals and there are bubbles.  In short, given the importance of intermediaries' trading in
financial markets asset pricing theories and intermediation theories need to become better integrated.27
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Governments Bonds A long-term obligation by the firm to make a series of fixed
payments 
Notes An intermediate obligation
Bills A short-term obligation
Banks Deposits Funds deposited at a bank available on demand or with
some delay
Acceptances A written promise to pay a given sum at a prespecified date
Firms Equity Equityholders are the owners of the firm and are responsible
for conducting its affairs
Bonds A long-term obligation by the firm 
Convertibles A bond that can be swapped for equity at a prespecified
ratio or vice versa
Preferred stock A hybrid security that combines features of debt and equity
Commercial paper A short-term debt security issued by firms that can be easily
traded
Warrants A long-term call option on a firm's stock issued by the firm
Exchanges Commodity futures Contracts for future delivery of a commodity  32
Table 2
Recent Financial Innovations
Main Issuer Instrument Characteristics
Exchanges Financial futures Contracts for the future delivery of currencies, securities, or
an amount of money based on an index
Options The right to buy or sell a security on or before a specified 
date
Banks Swaps Transactions in which different streams of income are
exchanged
Governments Securitized loans Pools of mortgages or other types of loans that are publicly
traded
Firms Floating-rate debt The interest rate on the debt is based on LIBOR, the T-bill
rate or some other index
Floating-rate A substitute for money market
preferred funds that captures the dividends-received deduction for 
firms
Primes and scores Equity is split into a prime component that has dividends
and capital gains up to a stated price and a score component
that has capital gains above this
Synthetics Securities that allow combinations of assets to be obtained
with low transaction costs33
Table 3
Global Markets for Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives 
(US$ billions; figures in parentheses are percentage share)
Notional Gross Average daily
amounts market turnover of
outstanding values notional
as of March 31, 1995 amounts in
April 1995
A.  OTC Contracts
Total OTC Contracts   40,714 (100) 1,745 (100)  839 (100)
Foreign exchange 13,153  (32) 1,021   (59) 688   (82)
  Forwards and swaps     8,742  (21)       602   (34) 643   (77)
  Currency swaps     1,974    (5)         345   (20)         4     (0)
  Options   2,375    (6)          69     (4)  40      (5)
Interest rates 26,645  (65)       646  (37) 151   (18)
  FRAs   4,597  (11)          18    (1)        66     (8)
  Swaps 18,283  (45)       560  (32)   63     (8)
  Options   3,548    (9)          60    (3)   21     (3)
B.  Exchange-Traded Derivatives  
Total  16,581 (100) 1,136 (100)
Interest rate contracts 15,674   (95) 1,121   (99)
Source:   Bank of Japan, Quarterly Bulletin, May 1996
Tables 2, 3, 4, 9.8
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